We consider a competitive …nancial market in which companies engage in strategic …nancial reporting knowing that investors only pay attention to …nitely many aspects of …rms' reports and extrapolate from their sample. We investigate the extent to which stock prices differ from the fundamental values, assuming that companies must report all their activities but are otherwise free to disaggregate their reports as they wish. We show that no matter how many aspects investors are able to consider, a monopolist can induce a price of its stock bounded away from the fundamental. Besides, competition between companies may exacerbate stock mispricing.
Introduction
Financial reporting is a highly strategic business for …rms. Being strategic on the …nancial reporting may take di¤erent forms such as falsifying current statistics to meet the expected targets, engaging in earnings managements (aimed, for example, at smoothing earnings performances over time), or issuing more or less disaggregated earnings forecasts by type of activities (thereby making it more or less di¢ cult to assess the overall pro…tability of the …rm).
If investors were fully rational, such strategic considerations would presumably not cause major problems, as investors would be able to make the correct inference from what is being disclosed to them. But, many investors are not fully sophisticated, some of them taking at face value the …nancial reports they get exposed (or pay attention) to. In face of this, in the early days of accounting scandals, various forms of investor protection have been advocated so as to avoid that …nancial reports be too disconnected from the true performance of the …rm.
1 Yet, no matter how powerful the regulatory body is, there seem to be some fundamental limits to investor protection and transparency requests. Firms are often (and for legitimate reasons) left with signi…cant discretion in evaluating their activities and in communicating their evaluations to investors. In this paper, we wish to explore the impact of strategic …nancial reporting on whether the prices of stocks correctly re ‡ect the fundamental value of the …rms in a world in which investors are not fully sophisticated. We address this question in a context in which …rms are constrained in the kind of …nancial reporting they can consider, re ‡ecting some form of investor protection. More precisely, using the metaphor of the issuance of earnings forecast, we allow each …rm to choose freely how disaggregated it wishes to report its forecasts, but we require that every activity of the …rm be included. As a result, what the …rm reports to investors must be in aggregate correct. 2 We also impose a lower bound on the pro…tability on a single activity that can be reported by a …rm, and we normalize it to zero. 3 Clearly, if investors could process the entire information they get exposed to in a perfectly rational way, the frame of the …nancial report (how disaggregated it is) would make no di¤erence. But, what if investors are not able to process the information fully? Speci…cally, we assume that investors pay only attention to a …nite number of dimensions of the various …nancial reports (each investor considers a di¤erent sample drawn at random), and investors extrapolate from their sample so as to form an estimate of how pro…table each …rm is. Based on this, if the price of the stock is below the estimate they are willing to buy, and if it is above they are willing to (short) sell. In order to highlight the e¤ect of extrapolation in the simplest setup, we assume that every investor can only trade one stock (either buy or short sell).
Assuming …rms seek to maximize the price of their stocks, 4 the above setup de…nes a game between …rms in which the strategy of a …rm bears on how disaggregated it wishes to make its …nancial report. To make our investigation more focused, we assume there is no fundamental uncertainty in the economy. That is, the various …rms have a deterministic fundamental value ' > 0 and this is the same for all …rms (yet it is unknown to investors who form estimates about it, as explained above). We ask ourselves: Are prices di¤erent from the fundamental? How is the answer a¤ected by the sophistication of investors (as measured by the number of dimensions investors pay attention to)? How is the answer a¤ected by the competitiveness of the …nancial market (as measured by the number of …rms competing for investors'capital)?
Super…cial reasoning would suggest that given that on average the estimates of investors have to be correct (since the dimensions looked at are independently drawn across investors), the possible mistakes made at the individual level would cancel out, and thus no signi…cant distortion should be expected. Yet, this intuition is incorrect. To illustrate this most simply, consider the case of a monopolist facing investors who would just consider one aspect of the …nancial report. The market clearing price corresponds to the median of the distribution chosen by the monopolist (that is the price level at which there are as many investors willing to buy as there are investors willing to sell). Hence, the monopolist wishes to choose a distribution of non-negative signals whose mean coincides with the fundamental and whose median is the largest. Solving this problem reveals that the monopolist can achieve a price of its stock as high as 2' by using a two signal distribution concentrated on 0 and 2' with a weight slightly larger than 1=2 on 2'. So, in our model, a well designed …nancial reporting strategy would induce a signi…cant distortion away from the fundamental.
The next question is: How is the distortion a¤ected by the degree of sophistication of investors and by market competition?
Regarding sophistication, it would seem that as investors consider more and more dimensions in the …nancial report, they would approach the correct assessment of the pro…tability of the …rm. If they could consider all dimensions, this would be true. But, suppose instead investors pay attention to a …nite number of dimensions. No matter how large this number is, we show that a monopolist can guarantee that the price of its stock remains bounded away from the fundamental. 5 Regarding competition, we consider the case in which investors only consider one dimension of the …nancial report, and we focus on the symmetric equilibrium which induces the highest stock prices (which we motivate based on tacit collusion considerations). Our main result is that more …rms make the price of stocks further away from the fundamental. So, competition may magnify the mispricing of stocks. While the logic of this result is somewhat involved (it will be explained later on in detail), 6 such a result is strongly suggestive that it would be unwise to rely on the observation that there are many …rms around to dismiss the potential e¤ect of strategic …nancial reporting onto the mispricing of stocks.
Related literature
The sampling heuristic we consider for investors has been …rst proposed by 5 The key observation here is that the optimal reporting strategy endogenously depends on the sophistication of the investors. Because of this dependence, the law of large numbers does not apply and the estimates of investors are not necessarily close to the fundamental. 6 Note that it was not a priori clear in which direction competition would tilt the bias. In fact, inducing a higher market clearing price would require attracting more demand and so tilt the …nancial reporting distribution toward higher signals. Yet, since the mean of the distribution has to coincide with the fundamental, that would have to be counter-balanced by having more weight on low signals. This makes it hard to identify how the most relevant deviations would look like and so what e¤ect competition may have on stock prices. Osborne and Rubinstein (1998) in a game-theoretic context. It captures the idea that agents may extrapolate too much from small samples, a cognitive bias referred to as the "law of small numbers" by Tversky and Kahneman (1971) . 7 Several studies have documented the tendency of investors to extrapolate too much from small samples (see e.g. Benartzi (2001) ; Baquero and Verbeek (2008) ; Greenwood and Nagel (2009) ), 8 but this paper seems to be the …rst one to address how such a bias may a¤ect the choice of …nancial reporting strategy and the resulting pricing of stocks. Since Osborne and Rubinstein (1998) , the sampling heuristic has been considered in IO settings by Spiegler (2006a) and Spiegler (2006b) in which …rms compete on prices and consumers choose their …rms by a sampling procedure (the sampling bears on the quality in Spiegler (2006b) whereas it bears on the price draw as well in Spiegler (2006a) ).
9 Our model follows the spirit of
Spiegler in the modeling of investors'heuristics and in the questions that are being addressed (e¤ect of sophistication, e¤ect of competition). But our application is di¤erent, leading to di¤erent formulations of the game and di¤erent conclusions. In particular, in our setting, prices are determined through market clearing conditions, and the mean of the …nancial reporting distribution used by …rms has to coincide with the fundamental, a constraint that has no analog in Spiegler'settings. In terms of results, our …nding that more …rms may induce larger distortions is somewhat di¤erent from that in Spiegler who obtains the weaker conclusion that distortions do not disappear with competition. Similarly, our …nding that some signi…cant distortion persists, even if investors consider arbitrarily large sample sizes has no counterpart in Spiegler. From a more general perspective, alternative models of investors'overextrapolation have been considered in the context of …nancial markets. De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990b) study whether arbitrageurs have a stabilizing role in the presence of extrapolative investors, while Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Rabin (2002) and Rabin and Vayanos (2010) focus on how extrapolative investors react to news. None of these papers studies the issue of strategic …nancial reporting, which is the main focus of 7 See the recent book by Kahneman (2011) for several colorful accounts of this bias. 8 More generally, several recent studies document the role of limited attention in investment decisions and its e¤ect on …nancial markets (Barber and Odean (2008) , Dellavigna and Pollet (2009), Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009)) .
9 See also Rubinstein and Spiegler (2008) , who consider a speculative market in which investors randomly sample one price in the history of posted prices and buy if the current price is below the sampled price. our paper. In a di¤erent vein, a few recent papers analyze stock prices in competitive equilibria with non-fully rational agents (in Gul, Pesendorfer and Strzalecki (2011) , agents can only distinguish a limited number of contingencies; in Eyster and Piccione (2011) , agents have a limited understanding of the functioning of the market). An essential distinctive feature of our study is the focus on how investors'beliefs may be manipulated, which has no counterpart in these papers. Finally, …rms'strategies in …nancial reporting are analyzed in a large literature in accounting (see e.g. Verrecchia (2001) for a survey, and Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) for a model in which investors have limited attention). This literature, however, generally abstracts from the role of improved investors'sophistication and of market competition on …rms'reporting strategies.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. In Section 3 we analyze the monopoly case in the simplest sophistication scenario. In Section 4 we study the e¤ect of sophistication. In Section 5 we study the e¤ect of competition. Section 6 o¤ers a general discussion, in particular, discussing the role of bounded rationality in the results as well as the introduction of alternative investment heuristics. Section 7 concludes.
Model
Consider a stock market consisting of F …rms j = 1; :::F , each having fundamental value '. There is a unitary mass of investors trading on the stock market. Investors are unaware of the fundamental values of the …rms. They assess the pro…tability of the various …rms by taking at face value the …nan-cial reports they pay attention to (see details below). Each investor can only trade one stock (either buy or short sell), and he trades the one for which he perceives the highest gain from trade. The prices of the various stocks are determined through market clearing conditions.
Firms are assumed to know the procedure followed by investors, and they seek to maximize the price of their stocks. They choose the best …nancial reporting that consists in a choice of distribution of non-negative signals whose mean is constrained to coincide with the fundamental value ': There is complete information among …rms, and we consider the Nash equilibria of the …nancial reporting game played by the …rms. In particular, our analysis will focus on whether the prices of the stocks di¤er from the fundamental values, and how the sophistication of investors (see below for a measure of sophistication) and/or the degree of competitiveness (as measured by F ) a¤ect the result.
Formally, let j denote the distribution of signals chosen by …rm j and X j be the support of j . 11 We require that
and
for each j = 1; :::; F: 12 We denote by the set of signal distributions satisfying conditions (1)-(2), and we allow …rms to choose any distribution in : As mentioned, the objective of each …rm j is to maximize its trading price p j :
Investors ignore the fundamental values of the …rms, and they employ a simple procedure in order to assess them. For each …rm, they consider K independent random draws from the …rm's signal distribution, and they interpret the average of these K signals as the …rm's fundamental value. 
The draws are assumed to be independent across investors.
14 Firms know that 11 Alternatively, j may be interpreted as a sequence of activity reports with non-negative returns that add up to '. We chose the distribution formulation because it is mathematically simpler to express.
12 As already mentioned, condition (1) can be interpreted by saying that all investors have in mind a lower bound on the pro…tability of a single activity (here, normalized to 0). An alternative interpretation is that if on one activity the earnings report were too low, it would attract too much attention, and it would in the end be detrimental to the …rm. Condition (2) can be motivated by investor protection considerations requiring that every single activity be included in the …nancial reporting but allowing the …rm to disaggregate its reporting as it wishes.
13 In our analysis, the same signal can be drawn several times. Yet, given that the …rm can choose as many signals as it wishes, nothing would change if there were no replacements in the draws.
14 From a theoretical perspective, note that such an assumption is the most favorable to investors employ this procedure; in particular, …rms know K: 15 We further assume that each investor is allowed to trade one unit of stock and he can either buy or short sell it. 16 Hence, investor i is willing to trade stock r if stock r is perceived to o¤er the highest gains from trade. That is, if
Investor i will buy stock r if p r <x r i and he will short sell stock r if p r >x r i . Note that arg max j p j x j i may sometimes consist of several stocks r; in which case investor i is indi¤erent between several options. In case of indifferences, a tie-breaking rule speci…es the probability assigned to the various possible trades. We let denote the set of tie-breaking rules and ! denote an element of :
Based on investors' orders, and on the tie-breaking rule !; demand and supply for …rm j are denoted by D j ( j ; j ; p j ; p j ; !) and
; where j and p j denote respectively distributions and prices for all …rms except j: We denote the pro…le of demand and supply for all …rms as D( ; p; !) and S( ; p; !); where = f j g and p = fp j g ; j = 1; ::; F .
An equilibrium is de…ned as follows.
De…nition 1 (Equilibrium) The pro…le ( ; p; !) is an equilibrium if: for each j, j 2 , and a) D( ; p; !) = S( ; p; !): b) There is no distribution~ j 2 ; pricesp j ;p j ; and tie-breaking rule! 2
The …rst condition requires that the markets clear. The second condition requires that there should be no pro…table deviation for each …rm j; where a pro…table deviation~ j of …rm j means that for the pro…le of distributions
, there exists a tie-breaking rule! and pricesp j ;p j that clear the markets and such that …rm j achieves a strictly higher pricep j > p j .
17 market e¢ ciency. Introducing some systematic correlation in investors'draws, e.g. allowing that some signals are known to receive more attention than others, typically weakens the e¤ect of condition (2) and is likely to increase the scope for distortions. 15 In Section 6, we brie ‡y consider the case in which investors have heterogeneous K. 16 We chose this speci…cation to make the model as simple as possible. We expect though that the thrust of our results would continue to hold in settings in which investors face other forms of trading limits such as wealth and short selling constraints. 17 There are alternative possible de…nitions of pro…table deviations (based on other ex-In the following analysis, we will prove the existence of an equilibrium (in a constructive manner). Discrete distributions with a …nite number of signals will play an important role. We will denote by = fx 1 ; 1 ; x 2 ; 2 ; ::g the distribution in which x 1 occurs with probability 1 ; x 2 occurs with probability 2 ; and so on.
Monopoly
We …rst consider a monopolistic …rm facing investors who just consider one dimension in the …nancial report. That is, we set F = 1 and K = 1:
Since each investor only trades one stock, the market clearing price is the median of the …rm's signals. At this price, half of the investors wants to buy and half of them wants to sell (so that the market clears). Hence, the monopoly's problem is to choose a distribution with the maximal median that satis…es the constraints (1) and (2) that signals should be non-negative and that the mean of the distribution should coincide with the fundamental '.
Such a maximization is achieved with a two-signal distribution that puts weight on 0 and h and such that the median is just h (requiring that the weight on h is just above that on 0).
18 Consider then = f0; 1 ; h; g with 1=2. The aggregation condition (2) implies that h = ', and thus the maximum price that can be achieved by the monopolist is 2'. The following Proposition summarizes this.
Proposition 1 Suppose F = 1 and K = 1: The …rm chooses the distribution M = f0; 1=2; 2'; 1=2g : The price is p M = 2':
Monopoly and Sophistication
We now turn to a setting in which investors are more sophisticated in the sense of considering larger samples. More precisely, we consider a monopolistic …rm and we assume that investors sample several (K > 1) signals in order to pectations about the ensuing market clearing prices). We chose this one to simplify the exposition of our results. Note also that any equilibrium as de…ned here would a fortiori be an equilibrium under the alternative speci…cations of pro…table deviations. 18 To see this, observe that any signal strictly above the median is a waste for the …rm as reducing such a signal to the median while increasing all signals slightly so as to meet the aggregation condition would be pro…table. Similarly, any signal strictly between 0 and the median is a waste, establishing the result. evaluate the fundamental value of the …rm. The question is whether the price gets close to the fundamental if we let K be su¢ ciently large.
Based on the law of large number, one might have expected that, for K large enough, investors would end up with a correct assessment of the fundamental value, and thus the market clearing price would have to be close to '. Such an intuition would be true if the …nancial reporting strategy of the …rm were set independently of K. But, this is not the relevant consideration here, given that the …rm can adjust its …nancial reporting strategy to the number of draws K made by investors. Thus, the distribution chosen by the …rm will typically change with K, and the law of large number can no longer be applied.
As we show now, the …rm can always guarantee a price bounded away from the fundamental by a suitable choice of reporting strategy (that must depend on K by the previous argument).
To see this, consider the following two-signal distribution:
and the price p(K) = h=K; with h = '=[1 (1=2) 1=K ] so that the mean of the distribution is '. An investor who gets K draws from the distribution and samples z times the signal h is willing to buy if the price does not exceeds zh=K. As the price equals h=K; only those who sample K times signal 0 are willing to sell, which is a proportion [(1=2) 1=K ] K of investors. That is, at this price half of investors sell and half of the investors buy, so the market clears. So given K, the monopolist can achieve a price of its stock no smaller than
Simple algebra reveals that p(K) is decreasing with K and that p(K) converges to '= ln 2, which is strictly bigger than '; as K grows arbitrarily large. Hence, we have established:
Proposition 2 Suppose F = 1. Irrespective of K, the …rm can attain a price no smaller than '= ln 2; which is strictly larger than '.
As described in (4), the distribution used to establish Proposition 2 requires that there is no upper bound on the signals that can be sent by the
1=K ] goes to in…nity as K goes to in…nity). If there were an upper bound, the variance would have to be bounded, and the …rm would not be able to obtain a price of its stock much away from the fundamental when K is large.
Competition
We now turn to investigate the e¤ect of competition, i.e. having more than one …rm F > 1. To keep the analysis tractable, we consider the case in which investors only consider one dimension in the …nancial reporting, i.e. K = 1. Our main question of interest is whether more competition brings the prices of stocks closer to the fundamental values, and whether as there are many …rms, there is still some distortion away from the fundamental.
We divide the investigation of this question into various subsections.
A non-transparency result
A …rst observation is that no matter how many …rms are competing on the stock market, it cannot be an equilibrium that (all) …rms choose a transparent …nancial reporting saying what their fundamental value is with probability 1. Indeed, if all …rms send = f'; 1g, then obviously the market clearing price for all stocks is p = ': But, if …rm j chooses the distribution displayed in the monopoly case j = f0; 1=2; 2'; 1=2g (see Section 3), then …rm j can achieve a price of its stock as high as 2', thereby showing that the deviation is pro…table. This observation is summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Irrespective of F , there is no equilibrium in which …rms report their fundamental value with probability 1.
A second observation is that, irrespective of the strategy used by others, a …rm can always guarantee that the price of its stock is at least the fundamental value. Indeed if …rm j chooses j = f'; 1g then p j = ' is necessarily a market clearing price for j (and there is no other possible market clearing price for j if some of the stocks j are to be traded). 19 Given our de…nition of an equilibrium, this shows the following Proposition:
Proposition 4 In all equilibria, the price of stocks is no smaller than the fundamental value.
The highest price equilibrium
Characterizing all equilibria is somewhat di¢ cult because it requires getting into comparative statics properties of the Walrasian equilibria of the stock market as induced by the various possible choices of reporting strategies of the …rms (which in turn a¤ect in a complex way the demand and supply of the various stocks through the sampling strategy).
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For tractability reasons, we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria. That is, we require that in equilibrium …rms choose the same distribution of signals, the price of the various stocks is the same, and the tie-breaking rule is symmetric. 21 Moreover, among symmetric equilibria, we focus on the equilibrium that induces the highest prices of stocks. There are two ways to think of such a focus: 1) It highlights how much the prices can be far from the fundamental.
2) It is a natural benchmark equilibrium if we have in mind that the …rms in the stock market can coordinate on the equilibrium they like best (a form of selection based on tacit collusion). We will also in the next subsection discuss other (symmetric) equilibria. In order to characterize the highest price symmetric equilibrium, we proceed in several steps. We …rst consider a candidate symmetric equilibrium f ; p; !g ; with the distribution = fx 1 ; 1 ; x 2 ; 2 ; :::g : Suppose to start with that …rm j faced no constraint in its choice of distribution so that it could choose the distribution~ j = fx 1 + "; 1 ; x 2 + "; 2 ; ::g ; which is derived by increasing all signals by " and keeping the weights of the various signals unchanged. The prices p j = p + " and p j = p (together with the same tiebreaking rule !) would clear the market, 22 and thus~ j would be a pro…table deviation. 20 The theory of general equilibrium has essentially produced existence and e¢ ciency results but very few instances in which Walrasian prices can be explicitly derived from the demand and supply structure. For our purpose, it is the latter that is required though. 21 That is, if a mass of investors ends up with the same assessment about a set of N …rms, each of these …rms receives a fraction =N of the trades. 22 This follows from the observation that all demand and supply decisions are based on the pro…les of p i b x i and thus the increase of x j by " would be exactly o¤set by the increase of p j by ":
Of course, such a deviation is not feasible, as it implies E(X j ) = ' + ": However, as we show next, the …rm can implement a nearby deviation whenever there exists a signal x > 0 which is sent with positive probability and such that signal 2p x is not in the support of the distribution. The proposed deviation is such that all signals but x are shifted by " with the same weight and signal x is split between an upward shift of " and a downward shift of ; where and the weights of x and x + " are chosen to satisfy the aggregation condition (2). One can then de…ne a tie-breaking rule such that p j = p + " and p j = p clear the markets. 23 The following Lemma proven in the Appendix makes use of this observation:
Lemma 1 Consider a symmetric equilibrium pro…le f ; p; !g : If signal x is part of and x > 0, then also signalx where x +x = 2p is part of :
Lemma 1 de…nes a class of candidate distributions for symmetric equilibrium pro…les. In these distributions, positive signals need to be paired around the price. Speci…cally, we say that
(as de…ned by conditions (1) and (2)), and if there is no signal x > 0 which is part of b and such that signalx = 2p x is not part of b : Given Lemma 1, in order to …nd out symmetric equilibria, we can focus on distributions in which there exists a b 2^ such that j = b for all …rms j.
The second step in our argument is to characterize the distribution in that (together with the symmetric tie-breaking rule) induces the largest common market clearing price. We start by observing that to achieve the largest price, the distribution b in^ should assign positive weight to at most three signals. To see this, suppose that b assigns positive weight to n signals and n > 3: Denote by p the corresponding price of stocks. Then one can 23 To get a sense of this, assume that x > p: As a result of the deviation, …rm j loses the demand in case a signal x is drawn together with a signal x from another …rm (because now at the proposed prices the gains of trade are smaller with …rm j than with the other …rms). Such a lower demand for …rm j can however be compensated by assigning more demand to …rm j when signal x + " is drawn from …rm j together with signal x from the non-deviating …rms. For " and su¢ ciently small, and since signal 2p x is not part of the distribution, these are the only draws which are a¤ected by the proposed deviation, and thus the prices p j = p + " and p j = p do clear the markets with the corresponding tie-breaking rule. de…ne another distribution~ 2^ which involves at most n 1 signals and that induces a pricep p (assuming again a symmetric tie-breaking rule and that j =~ for all j). The idea is to remove the two signals closest to the price and move their mass either to the price (if the weight of the higher of the two signals is no smaller than the weight of the smaller one) or to the adjacent signals further away from the price (if the weight of the smaller signal is bigger than the weight of the higher signal).
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Iterating the argument, one gets a distribution with at most three signals, 0; p; 2p. Then, one can move equal mass from p to 0 and 2p or vice-versa and so end up with a two-signal distribution which takes one of the following forms:
Consider a . Investors are indi¤erent between trading stock j and stock r whenever they sample signal 2p a from …rm j and signal 0 from …rm r. The highest aggregate demand is obtained by letting investors buy j whenever indi¤erent between buying j and selling another stock. In that case, the aggregate supply includes only those who sample signal 0 from all …rms, which has probability (1 a ) F : Hence, market clearing requires (1 a )
; one can decrease slightly a and increase all signals by "
and obtain a price which is " higher. Hence, among distributions a , the price is maximized by setting (1 a ) F = 1=2: The highest market clearing price from distributions a is thus obtained with
and the resulting market clearing price is
The aggregate demand equals at most those who sample signal p b from all …rms, so market clearing requires ( b )
1=F which is lower than p :
This in turn leads to the next Lemma, whose detailed proof appears in the 24 Intuitively, such a move can be done while respecting the market clearing conditions. The direction of the move is then dictated so that the aggregation condition can be satis…ed by moving all signals (except possibly 0) as well as the price upwards. 25 The distribution c = fp c ; 1 c ; 2p c ; c g is easily ruled out given that by (2) it would imply that p c < ', which is clearly not the highest achievable price (see Proposition 4).
Appendix.
Lemma 2 Suppose that there exists b 2^ such that j = b for all j and consider a symmetric tie-breaking rule. The resulting market clearing price b p is no larger than p ; as de…ned in (6). Moreover, p is obtained with the distribution ; as de…ned in (5).
Our last step is to show that j = together with p j = p for all j and the symmetric tie-breaking rule de…nes an equilibrium. The complete proof is a bit tedious as it requires checking all sorts of multi-signal deviations. Yet, given the above use of the deviation obtained by shifting all signals by ", let us explain here why this is not pro…table whenever …rms choose the distribution . Suppose …rm j deviates to a two signal-distribution concentrated on " and h + " where
. By the aggregation condition, it should be that the weight on h + " is strictly smaller than 1 (1=2) 1=F . But, this would then imply that it is not possible to sustain p j = p + " and p j = p as market clearing prices given that the aggregate supply of all stocks would be strictly larger than 1=2. 26 As it turns out, with such a deviation the market clearing prices would be p j = " and p j = 0, and thus the deviation would not be pro…table. Extending that kind of arguments, we can show:
Lemma 3 There is a symmetric equilibrium in which …rms choose the distribution and the price is p ; as de…ned respectively in (5) and (6).
Combining Lemmas 1, 2 and 3, we get:
Proposition 5 Suppose K = 1 and F > 1. The maximal price achieved in a symmetric equilibrium is p =
: This price increases in F , and p ! 1 as F ! 1:
Proposition 5 shows that p increases with the number of competing …rms. The reason is that in this equilibrium investors are induced to sell stock j only when they sample F low signals. For a given probability of high signal, the more …rms, the lower the chance that the signals drawn from all …rms are low. To clear the market, one should thus decrease , which by the aggregation condition requires pushing the high signal (and thus the price which is half the high signal) upwards. Thus, when considering the highest price equilibrium, more competition induces more distortion away from the fundamental. In the limit, the market clearing price can grow arbitrarily large as F goes to in…nity.
A question arises as to how the market clearing price in the competitive case compares with the monopoly price (see Proposition 1). Simple calculations reveal that the price in the duopoly case is smaller than in the monopoly case, but the price for any other market structure con…guration (F > 2) is larger than in the monopoly case. 
Other Equilibria
As mentioned before, we think of the highest price symmetric equilibrium as the most meaningful one based on tacit collusion considerations. Yet, abstracting from such considerations, we wish here to highlight that there may be other (symmetric) equilibria. To illustrate this, we exhibit a symmetric equilibrium that induces a market clearing price as low as the fundamental (which combined with Propositions 4 and 5 allows us to show the range of market clearing prices that can be sustained in symmetric equilibria). More precisely, we have:
Proposition 6 Suppose K = 1. For every F > 1, there is a symmetric equilibrium with market clearing prices p = ': The common distribution of signals has support (0; 2'). It is centered around ', and it is such that the probability of sampling F 1 signals within distance z from ' is linear in z. When F = 2, it is the uniform distribution on (0; 2').
To get some intuition for the Proposition, consider the duopoly case F = 2. If …rm 1 chooses a uniform distribution of signals between 0 and 2', it is not hard to see that irrespective of the choice of distribution of …rm 2, the market clearing price for …rm 1 must be p 1 = '. Indeed at this price, and given the symmetry of the distribution of …rm 1 around ', there is as much demand as there is supply for …rm 1. More important for our purpose though is the observation that when …rm 1 chooses such a distribution, the market clearing price of …rm 2 cannot be larger than '. If the support of the distribution of …rm 2 coincides with (0; 2'), one can show that the market clearing price of the two …rms will have to be ', and any positive measure of signal above 2' would lead to a strictly lower price for …rm 2. This in turn establishes Proposition 6 for the duopoly case and the argument can be generalized for an arbitrary number of …rms (see the Appendix).
Two further comments about the equilibrium displayed in Proposition 6 are worth mentioning. First, as F increases, the corresponding distribution of signals becomes more concentrated around ' (so for this equilibrium, more competition eventually induces …nancial reports that get close to reporting the fundamental value with probability 1). Second, the equilibrium shown in Proposition 6 su¤ers from the following fragility. While the equilibrium requires that …rms choose a distribution with continuous density, an obvious alternative (and simpler) best-response would be for the …rms to choose a distribution putting mass 1 on the fundamental value. Yet, if …rms were to choose such a …nancial reporting strategy, this would not be an equilibrium (see Proposition 3).
Discussion

On investors'rationality
The above analysis has assumed a speci…c form of bounded rationality on investors' investment strategy. In this Subsection, we review three di¤erent sets of issues. 1) Do we need bounded rationality to produce our results? 2) What if investors use alternative heuristic procedures to make their investment decisions? 3) What if investors use heterogeneous procedures to make their investment decisions?
Is bounded rationality needed?
This is a standard (and legitimate) question to be asked about models which introduce some form of bounded rationality. In our economy, there is no fundamental uncertainty, as …rms have a uniquely de…ned fundamental value. Thus, if investors were fully rational, there would be no point for …rms to be strategic on their …nancial reporting and trades would necessarily occur at the fundamental value.
One might consider enriching the setup by introducing some asymmetric information with only the …rms knowing their fundamental values, and the …nancial reporting playing the role of how much information …rms are willing to release about their value. Even maintaining the assumption of full rationality of investors, there are di¤erent ways of modeling this, either assuming that …rms can commit ex ante to whatever disclosure sounds best (as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) , Rayo and Segal (2010) or Jehiel (2011)) or alternatively assuming that the disclosure strategy is chosen at the time the …rms know the realization of their private information (as in models of cheap talk, à la Crawford and Sobel (1982) ). While a complete analysis of such models goes beyond the scope of this paper, it sounds unlikely (based on previous works) that they would deliver insights similar to ours: 1) If trades are purely speculative as in our model, one could not generate trades based on the classic no trade argument; 2) If noise traders are added (as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) ), it sounds plausible that such models would deliver the classic insight that for asymptotically large economies prices aggregate well the dispersed information and thus correctly represent the fundamental values of …rms.
To sum up, while there are obviously rational approaches to the modeling of strategic information transmission, it is dubious that such approaches can deliver insights similar to ours.
On alternative heuristic procedures
Our main reason for studying the above speci…c form of bounded rationality is that we believe it re ‡ects a general tendency agents have about extrapolating from small samples, and our aim was to investigate the impact this could have in …nancial markets. Yet, there are several additional ingredients that could be added to the considerations of investors. For example, investors could consider that the price itself is indicative of the fundamental value. Alternatively, investors could base their estimate of the fundamental value not only on the part of the …nancial reporting they pay attention to but also on the market sentiment (De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990a)). Finally, investors could take into account that their estimate is noisy and adjust their investment decision accordingly.
There are several possible ways to incorporate such ideas into the heuristic of investors. We propose some that allow us to preserve our qualitative analysis, thereby suggesting some form of robustness of our results with respect to richer speci…cations of investors'procedures.
In the main model, investor i made an estimate of the fundamental value of …rm j based on the average sample signalx j i from j. Suppose instead that investor i assesses the fundamental value of …rm j according to
where i 2 [0; 1) re ‡ects the subjective weight attached by investor i to the informativeness of the price relative to the informativeness of the private signal and thus, our previous analysis would apply equally to this new speci…cation. Regarding the idea of "market sentiment", we may model the latter as the average belief of the various investors about the pro…tability of the …rm. Given that as already noted, the mean of the …nancial reporting distribution has to coincide with the fundamental, the average belief about …rm j corresponds to its fundamental value. Thus, an investor i receiving an average samplex j i from j would assess …rm j according to
where i 2 [0; 1) represents the weight given by investor i to the market sentiment. The gains from trade attached to asset j would be perceived to be
, and the main messages of our previous analysis would remain qualitatively the same. 28 Finally, we could incorporate the idea that investors would take into account that their estimate of the fundamental value is noisy. For example, when investors draw several signals K > 1, instead of simply considering the mean of the signal and reason as if it were the fundamental value, investors could also consider the empirical variance in the sample and reason as if the fundamental value was a random variable normally distributed with mean and variance coinciding with the corresponding empirical values in the sample. With risk neutral investors (as we assumed) this would have no consequence. With risk-averse investors, it is not clear a priori in which way our main analysis would change given that both buying and short selling would be 28 As K grows large in the monopoly case, the price would be bounded by i ' + (1 i )'= ln 2; which exceeds ': In the oligopoly case with K = 1, as F grows large, the maximal price sustainable in equilibrium would be i ' + (1 i )p ; where p denotes the price characterized in Section 5. perceived as risky. A more systematic investigation of such heuristics should be the subject of future work.
Playing on investors'cognitive types
In the case of multiple …rms, we assumed that K = 1. Analyzing fully a general setting with arbitrary K is a bit cumbersome. Yet, we conjecture that similar insights obtain, and, in particular, more competition may still drive the price further away from the fundamental in the K > 1 case. Following the logic of our previous analysis, one can show that, for any F , there is a market clearing price which is bounded away from the fundamental no matter how large is K. Moreover, irrespective of K; the market clearing price can grow arbitrarily large as F grows large.
29
In the main analysis, all investors were assumed to have the same K. What if investors can have di¤erent K? Dealing in general with the case of heterogeneous populations is quite involved. We consider here the special case in which investors are either fully rational (K = 1) with probability or they are assumed to follow the K -sampling procedure with probability 1 . We still assume that investors whether fully rational or boundedly rational can trade only one stock. As in our setting the fundamental value of each …rm is deterministic, rational investors know it with certainty. Given that the price is typically above the fundamental value, rational investors would all go for short selling. Our previous equilibrium constructions should then be modi…ed by adding a fraction to the aggregate supply. Yet, it is not di¢ cult to show that, provided is not too large, our previous insights carry through. 
Alternative objectives for …rms
In our main model, …rms were assumed to maximize the price of their stocks. We think this is a natural objective for managers whose managerial compensation is to a non-negligible extent indexed on the value of the stock. Yet, there may be other motives driving the choice of …nancial reporting strategy. For example, reputation considerations may lead …rms to look as transparent 29 This can be shown by applying a very similar argument as in Sections 4 and 5 to the distribution = f0; 1 ; h; g ; where is de…ned by market clearing as (1 ) F K = 1=2: 30 To see this, one can apply the same analysis as above and just modify the market clearing conditions. In Section 4, market clearing would require (1 ) K (1 ) + = 1=2: In Section 5, it would require (1 )
as possible, which would clearly alleviate the distortions highlighted in this paper. Alternatively, managers may try to look better than their competitors. We analyze brie ‡y this case assuming that there are two …rms, F = 2 and that the sample size of investors is K = 1. Firm j is now assumed to maximize p j p j . 31 This modi…ed objective function leads to a di¤erent game between …rms, and in the F = 2 case, the resulting game is a symmetric zero-sum game whose value is 0 (since picking the same strategy as the competitor gives in expectation 0). Yet, knowing the value of the game does not tell us what the resulting price of stocks is. Exploiting the analysis of Section 5, we now observe that there is an equilibrium in which the price coincides with the fundamental p = ', which is sustained by having the two …rms using a uniform distribution between 0 and 2', that is, R U (0; 2'): This follows from the proof of Proposition 6, in which we show that if …rm j chooses R , then we have p j = ' and p j ' for any distribution chosen by …rm j: Hence, no …rm can get a price higher than the competitor when the competitor chooses R :
32
Proposition 7 Suppose F = 2 and …rms seek to maximize relative price.
There is a symmetric equilibrium in which …rms choose the uniform distribution on (0; 2') and the price of stocks is ':
We suspect that the equilibrium shown in Proposition 7 is the only equilibrium. 33 If so, the change of objective of …rms from absolute to relative price would a¤ect dramatically the conclusion. Now competition brings the prices of stocks down to the fundamental (even if again …rms do not use a transparent …nancial reporting strategy).
31 Condition (b) in the de…nition of equilibrium should be modi…ed accordingly by requiring that there is no distribution~ j 2 ; pricesp j ;p j ; and tie-breaking rule! 2 such that Surprisingly, Myerson (1993) obtains the same uniform distribution as an equilibrium in the Blotto game (with a continuum of battle …elds). While the aggregation condition is clearly the same in the two problems, the market clearing condition seems to have no analog in the Blotto game, making the connection unexpected. 33 We were able to show that there is no equilibrium with discrete distributions (as moving all signals by " and changing slightly the weights would induce a pro…table deviation). We suspect there is no other equilibrium with continuous density, thereby explaining the conjecture.
Conclusion
This paper has considered a stylized …nancial market in which …rms may strategically frame their …nancial reports so as to induce higher stock prices. We have illustrated how the introduction of less sophisticated (though not stupid) investors in such a setting could alter dramatically the analysis of market e¢ ciency. Capital market competition has been shown to be ine¤ective in ensuring that prices are close to fundamentals. We note that it is unclear what kind of regulation could improve the working of the …nancial reporting business. A form of investor protection requesting that overall there should be no lie in the …nancial reporting was shown in this paper not to restore market e¢ ciency. Of course, distilling the idea to investors and managers that transparency and simplicity of …nancial reporting are desirable could alleviate the problems we have highlighted, but it is unclear whether just relying on such vague recommendations could be enough.
Appendix Proof of Proposition 1
As shown in the text, the price p M = 2' clears the market when the …rm sends the distribution M = f0; 1=2; 2'; 1=2g : We now show that no distribution induces a higher price. Suppose that the …rm sends the distribution = fx 0 ; 0 ; x 1 ; 1 ; x 2 ; 2 ; ::; x N ; N g with 0 = x 0 < x 1 < x 2 < ::: < x N and n 0 for n = 0; :::; N: (We consider a discrete distribution for simplicity of notation, the argument is the same if we consider continuous distributions.) Market clearing requires that the price is the median of the distribution. If there are several medians (because of the discreteness of the distribution), then considering the largest median is enough to characterize the largest market clearing price. Thus, we let p = x 
1=2:
Maximizing x n while satisfying the above constraints and the constraint in (2) requires setting w = 0 for all w 2 [1; N (n 1)]. Moreover, by setting x w = x n for all w 2 [n + 1; N ], x n can be increased, and so p can be increased, while still satisfying condition (2). Hence, we are left with a distribution = f0; 1 ; x n ; g with 1=2. Condition (2) requires x n '= : As we need 1=2 to have p > 0; it follows that x n 2': Thus, no alternative distribution can induce a price higher than p M : Q. E. D.
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the equilibrium pro…le f ; p; !g and suppose that there exists a signal x > 0 which is part of (that is, to which the distribution assigns positive mass) and such that signalx = 2p x is not part of : Let x denote its weight. We show that one …rm (say …rm j) has a pro…table deviation. In particular, suppose …rm j deviates to the distribution " ; in which all signals are increased by " and all weights are kept constant except the one on signal
x: The weight on signal x is split into two signals, x + " with mass " and x with mass x " ; where " > 0 is small and is de…ned by condition (2) so that x x = " (x + ") + ( x " )(x ) + (1 x )": We then show that there exists a tie-breaking rule! and a " such that the market clears with
To establish this, suppose that x > p (the argument is symmetric with x < p). Denote by z the total mass of signals that are at a distance to the price smaller than x is. That is, z = P fn s.t. 2p x<xn<xg n : The tie-breaking rule! after the deviation is the same as that before the deviation except when the draw for …rm j is x + " and (some) draws from …rms j are x in which case we assume the entire demand (if any) goes to …rm j (remember we are postulating that the prices after the deviation are p j = p + " and p j = p, hence the ties for the corresponding draws).
The demand for each …rm before the deviation can be written as
where W is una¤ected by the proposed deviation (provided that " and are su¢ ciently small).
The new demand for the deviating …rm j is
assuming that " and are su¢ ciently small. The assumption that there is no signal 2p x guarantees that the total demand (of all …rms) is the same after and before the deviation and so is the total supply, provided that " and are small enough (which will be checked ex post). Thus, it is enough to check that at prices p j = p + " and p j = p,
That is,
It is readily veri…ed from (7) that
; which implies that ! 0 as " ! 0, and thus, and " can be chosen arbitrarily small while satisfying (7) and condition (2).
Hence, if …rm j deviates to x + " with mass " and x with mass x " ; where " is de…ned in (7), …rm j can get p j = p + " (while p j = p), which shows that we cannot have a x > 0 which belongs to the equilibrium strategy and such that signalŝ = 2p x is not part of : Q. E. D.
Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose all …rms send the same distribution 2^ and consider a symmetric tie-breaking rule. Denote by p the market clearing price: Suppose that assigns positive mass to 2n + 1 signals, 0; x 1 ; x 2 ; ::; x n ; x + n ; ::; x In step 5, we show that no distribution with at most two signals induces a price higher than p ; as de…ned in (6): We conclude that p is the maximal market clearing price when …rms choose a distribution 2^ :
Step 1. Consider signal x n ; x + n . Suppose x + n x n and b n < x n ; that is, there is no atomless part of the distribution at a lower distance from the price (we consider the atomless parts of the distribution in step 3 below): Then one can induce a price p + 1 ; where 1 0 will be de…ned below, by …rst moving x + n and x n to p and then moving all signals x 2X up by 1 . To show this, we …rst show that by moving x + n and x n to p one can induce the same market clearing price p and employ a signal distribution whose average is lower than ': Then, we can move all signals x 2X up by 1 to obtain a price p + 1 with a signal distribution in^ whose average is ': To see this, suppose …rms send signal p with weight x + n + x n instead of sending signals x + n and x n : Those who sample signal p for all …rms are indi¤erent between buying and selling. Denote as 1 the fraction of them who buy. Suppose …rst that, before the change in the distribution, whenever an investor sampled signal x + n from …rm j and signal x n from …rm| he bought stock j. The old aggregate demand is
where Z 1 depends on the signals further away from p and is una¤ected with the proposed change. The new aggregate demand (after the change) iŝ
Market clearing at p requiresD 1 = D 1 ; that is
Suppose instead that whenever an investor sampled signal x + n from …rm j and signal x n from …rm| he sold stock|. The old demand isD 1 = ( x + n ) F +Z 1 and so market clearing at p requiresD 1 =D 1 ;
F ; where again 1 < 1:
Hence, we can de…ne
and move all signals x 2X up by 1 so as to satisfy condition (2) and have a price p + 1 : Note that the resulting distribution still belongs to^ . The same will be true in the next steps.
Step 2. The procedure in step 1 can be repeated until one considers signals x m ; x + m where m max t n t :
< x n ; then m = n), or until one encounters an atomless part of the distribution at a lower distance from the price. Suppose one ends up with weight p 2 on signal p 2 and market clearing requiring that a fraction 2 of those who sample signal p 2 for all …rms buy. Consider …rst x m ; x 
k 2 ; and p 2 with probability^ p 2 = p 2 + 2k 2 : Suppose a fraction m of those who sample signal p for all …rms buy. We wish to de…ne a k 2 2 (0; x + m ) and a m 2 (0; 1) such that p 2 clears the market. Suppose …rst that whenever an investor samples signal x + m from …rm j and signal x m from …rm| he buys stock j and similarly for signals x m 1 . 34 The pre-change aggregate demand is
The new aggregate demand (considering the same symmetric tie-breaking rule after the change of distribution) iŝ
Suppose k 2 = 0 and m = 1: Notice that
The …rst term in square brackets is positive (because of the convexity of 
) and a m 2 (0; 1) such thatD 2 = D 2 : Suppose instead that, before the change, whenever an investor sampled signal x + m from …rm j and signal x m from …rm| he sold stock| and similarly 34 We can wlog assume the indi¤erences are broken in the same way when x m vs x for signals x m 1 . The old aggregate demand is
and the new aggregate demand (considering the same symmetric tie-breaking rule after the change of distribution) is
Similarly to above, suppose k 2 = 0 and m = 1; then since (
and m = 0 then D 2 <D 2 and so there exists a k 2 2 (0; x + m ) and a m 2 (0; 1) such that D 2 =D 2 : Notice now that, following the same procedure as in the step 1, x
: Hence, we can de…ne
where 2 0; and move all signals x 2X up by 2 so as to satisfy condition (2) and have a price p 2 + 2 :
Step 3. Suppose one encounters an atomless part of the distribution and there is no other signal at a lower distance from the price. Suppose the price is p 3 and consider the distribution with density g(x) over the interval [a n ; b n ] and density h(x) over [b + n ; a + n ]. We now show that one can induce a price p 3 + 3 by …rst collapsing all signals x 2 [a n ; b n ] into one signal z 2 [a n ; b n ] and all signals x 2 [b + n ; a + n ] into signal z + ; where z + z + = 2p 3 ; and then moving all signals x 2X up by 3 (z and 3 will be de…ned below). To see this, suppose one collapses all signals x 2 [a n ; b n ] into signal z 2 [a n ; b n ] and all signals x 2 [b + n ; a n and all signals x 2 [a n ; b n ] were concentrated in b n ; that is,
and similarly D n and all signals x 2 [a n ; b n ] were concentrated in a n ; that is
Denote withD 3 the new aggregate demand after the change in the distribution. Assuming that whenever an investor samples signal z + from …rm j and signal z from …rm| he buys stock j we would haveD 3 = D max 3
: Assuming instead that whenever an investor samples signal z + from …rm j and signal z from …rm| he sells stock| we would haveD 3 = D and moving all signals x 2X up by 3 ; one can have a price p 3 + 3 with a distribution whose average is ': If instead 2p x + > x ; following a similar logic one can set z = x and z + = 2p x and move all signals x 2X up
so as to obtain the price p 3 +~ 3 : The procedure of step 1 or step 2 can then be applied to the resulting distribution.
Step 4. The argument in steps 1-3 can be iterated until one obtains a distribution 0; x 1 ; p 4 ; x : Then one could increase the price by repeating the argument in step 2 and moving x 1 to 0 and x + 1 to 2p 4 : We would end up with a threesignals distribution with 0; p; 2 p: Now consider the distribution 0; p; 2 p; with weights respectively~ 0 ; p ; 2p : The aggregate supply is at least
We show that there exists a two-signals distribution inducing a larger price. Suppose a mass k 4 is moved from p to 0 and a mass k 4 is moved from p to 2 p: Condition (2) holds and there exists a tie breaking rule so that the new aggregate supply is
That induces a higher price ifS 4 < S 4 ; that is the case ifS 4 decreases in k 4 at k 4 = 0: Taking the derivative ofS 4 with respect to k 4 ; we need that
Notice that dS 4 =dk 4 is decreasing in k 4 (1 2 F F 1 < 0 for all F 2); hence if dS 4 =dk 4 < 0 at k 4 = 0 then it is negative everywhere. Hence, we need that
If condition (8) holds, setting k 4 = p =2 we obtain a two-signals distribution which induces a higher price: Suppose instead
and suppose a mass k 4 is moved from 0 to p and a mass k 4 is moved from 2 p to p: Condition (2) holds and there exists a tie breaking rule so that the new aggregate supply iŝ
Similarly to above, that induces a higher price ifŜ 4 < S 4 ; that is the case if S 4 decreases in k 4 at k 4 = 0: Taking the derivative ofŜ 4 with respect to k 4 ; we need that
Notice that dŜ 4 =dk 4 is increasing in k 4 ; hence if dŜ 4 =dk 4 > 0 at k 4 = 0 then it is positive everywhere. Hence, we need that (2)
that is indeed condition (9). If condition (9) holds, setting k 4 = min f~ 0 ; 2p g we obtain a two-signals distribution which induces a higher price: Hence, the highest market clearing price is obtained with a two-signals distribution.
Step 5. We are then left with a two-signals distribution which takes one of the following forms: a = f0; 1 a ; 2p a ; a g or b = f0; 1 b ; p b ; b g or c = fp c ; 1 c ; 2p c ; c g. For the argument developed in the main text, among those distributions, the highest price is p ; as de…ned in (6), and it is achieved by ; as de…ned in (5). Q. E. D.
Proof of Lemma 3
We show that are p , as de…ned respectively in (5) and (6), are part of an equilibrium. To simplify the exposition, denote with h the positive signal which is part of and with its weight; that is
First, we show that there exists a tie-breaking rule such that ( ; p ) clears the market. Suppose that whenever indi¤erent between buying …rm r and selling another …rm j the investor buys r. Then since p = h=2 only those who sample a signal 0 for all …rms sell. The aggregate supply is (1 ) F that equals 1=2: Hence the aggregate demand is also 1=2, i.e. aggregate demand equals aggregate supply. As the equilibrium is symmetric, that implies that the market clears for each …rm. Consider now the possibility of deviations. Suppose …rm j deviated by sending n signals j = fx n ; n g ; we then show that there is no combination of weights n such that the market clears and p j > h=2: We …rst consider the case in which, after the deviation, all non deviating …rms (we denote them as j) are traded at the same price, which we denote as p (we later consider the possibility of assigning di¤erent prices to …rms j). It is …rst useful to distinguish those signals, which we call marginal, that make investors indi¤erent between trading j and another …rm, that is the set of
Since …rms j send two signals, there can be at most four marginal signals in j . We denote them as a; b; c; d with a < b < c < d: Non-marginal signals will be denoted as x 0 ; x 1 ; :::; x n with 0 x 0 < x 1 < ::: < x n : Denote with 0 = P xn<a n ; 1 = P xn2(a;b) n ; 2 = P xn2(b;c) n ; 3 = P xn2(c;d) n and 4 = P xn>d n : As we do not impose that any of these weights is strictly positive, this formulation includes the case in which …rm j sends any number of signals. (As it will be clear, this formulation also includes the case in which j has atomless parts.)
Suppose …rst that p > h=2: The aggregate demand for j is at most
; while the aggregate supply for j is at least
F 2); there is always excess supply in j: So we cannot have p > h=2: Suppose now p h=2: Suppose there exists a market clearing price p j = h=2 + "; with " > 0. Due to the de…nition of marginal signal, the following relations hold: p j a = h p and so a = " + p h=2; p j b = p and so b = h=2 + " p; c p j = p and so c = h=2 + " + p and d p j = h p and so
Because of requirement (2), it must be that
where is derived by letting x n ! 0 for all x n < b; x n ! b for all x n 2 (b; c);
Since signals cannot be negative, their average cannot fall short of : Hence, if > '; the distribution j would violate condition (2).
The highest p j is achieved when all investors buy stock j whenever indi¤erent between buying j and trading j and they instead trade a stock in j whenever indi¤erent between selling j and trade j since in this way aggregate demand for j would be maximized. In this case, market clearing in j requires
We also need that aggregate demand equals aggregate supply, which requires
In (12), the left hand side is the maximal aggregate demand while the right hand side is the minimal aggregate supply, as derived by letting investors buy whenever indi¤erent between buying and selling. Equation (12) can be rewritten as
that is
Suppose …rst d =dp < 0: Then it is necessary that condition (10) holds when p ! h=2 and " ! 0; that is we need h( c + 3 + d + 4 ) < '; that is
which is inconsistent with (15).
Suppose instead d =dp 0: Then it is necessary that condition (10) holds when p ! 0 and " ! 0: That writes
That is (1=2)(1
1; it follows from (11) that ( 0 + 1 + a )(1 )
Combining the two, 1 2 + 2(
Since 1 (1 ) F 1 < 2 for all F; that implies 3 + c 1 2 : But c > h=2 and (1 2 )h=2 = h=2 ' > ' for F > 2 so the requirement 3 + c 1 2 violates condition (2) when F > 2.
Suppose F = 2, p h=2 and d =dp 0. The demand for …rm j cannot exceed 4 + d + (1 )( d + 3 ) + 1 (1 ) c which is derived by allocating all the orders to …rm j in case investors draw signal d from j and signal h from j and in which 1 is the fraction of orders allocated to …rm j in case investors draw signal c from j and signal 0 from j: The supply for …rm j cannot fall short of 0 +(1 )( a + 1 )+ 2 a ; which is derived by allocating all the orders to …rm j in case investors draw signal b from j and signal 0 from j and in which 2 is the fraction of orders allocated to …rm j in case investors draw signal a from j and signal h from j. Hence, market clearing for …rm j requires
Similarly, market clearing for …rms j requires 
In order to satisfy (17), it is then necessary that 2 2 1=2 or that 2 3=2 : Both of these requirements are violated by :
Finally, suppose F > 2 and non-deviating …rms are traded at a di¤erent price. Suppose two non-deviating …rms, say …rm 1 and …rm 2; are traded respectively at prices p 1 and p 2 : Assume wlog that p 1 < p 2 : Let D 1 and D 2 denote the demand respectively for …rm 1 and 2; and S 1 and S 2 the corresponding supply. Suppose …rst that p 1 < h=2 < p 2 : Let denote the probability that, for all …rms r 6 = 2; no signal s r from …rm r is drawn such that js r p r j > p 2 :
Since p 2 > h=2; is not smaller than the probability that, for all …rms r 6 = 2; no signal s r from …rm r is drawn such that js r p r j h p 2 : Hence, we have (1 )
2
(1 ) ;
but (1 ) 2 > (1 ) since < 1=2 for all F: Hence, S 2 > D 2 and there is no market clearing for …rm 2 when p 1 < h=2 < p 2 . Suppose instead p 2 h=2: When signal 0 from …rm 1 is drawn together with signal 0 from …rm 2 an investor prefers trading stock 2 (since p 1 < p 2 ) and when signal 0 from …rm 1 is drawn with signal h from …rm 2 an investor prefers trading stock 2 (since p 1 < h p 2 ). Hence, S 1 = 0 and …rm 1 is not traded. Similarly, if p 1 h=2 an investor always prefers trading stock 1 whenever signal h is drawn from …rm 2. Hence, D 2 = 0 and …rm 2 is not traded.
We are then left with a market in which F 1 …rms are traded. Suppose that, among them, the non-deviating …rms are traded at the same price p. We can then repeat the above argument employing F 1 instead of F . As we show, the argument holds a fortiori since decreases in F . Suppose …rst that p > h=2: The aggregate demand for j is at most D j = F 2 ( b + c + 2 ); while the aggregate supply for j is at least S j = (1 F 2 )( b + c + 2 + 1 + 3 ): and since 1 (1 ) F 2 < 2; that requires 1 2 3 + c : As shown above, however, the last condition violates condition (2).
Finally, suppose that among the F 1 traded …rms there exist two nondeviating …rms which are traded at a di¤erent price. Then one can repeat the above argument and end up with F 2 traded …rms. Iterating, we would end up with 2 traded …rms. Let p be the price of the non-deviating …rm. The argument to rule out p > h=2 is unchanged. Also the argument to rule out p h=2 is the same than the case with F = 2 above (conditions (16) and (21) are violated for all F ). We conclude that there is no pro…table deviation and so the pro…le ( ; p ) is part of an equilibrium. Q. E. D.
Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose …rms send a distribution with support on [0; 2']; density g symmetric around ' and cdf G such that [1 2G(x)] F 1 = 1 x=' for x < ' and [2G(x) 1] F 1 = x=' 1 for x ':
Step 1. Market clearing requires p = ': In fact, at p = '; aggregate demand is
g(x)(x ')dx; Step 2. There is no pro…table deviation. To see this, suppose …rm j deviates to a distribution H with density h. Denote with p j the price of j and with p the price of non-deviating …rms. Notice …rst that market clearing requires p = '. In fact, if p = ' aggregate demand for non-deviating …rms is
while aggregate supply is
Notice that by symmetry of g; for any x ' there exists a signal v = 2' x such that g(x) = g(v). Hence, G(x) = 1 G(v); H(x ') = H(' v) and H(' x) = H(v '): Hence, h(x)dx;
while the supply of j would be
We claim that, D xh(x)dx;
which is indeed the case. Since D j S j at p j = '; it must be that p j ': Hence, there is no pro…table deviation. Q. E. D.
